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NOTES
FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONFRONTS THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In recent years, media commentators, political pundits, and
private citizens alike have spoken ominously of a rising tide of
violence in the Unted States.' Initially, their anxieties focused
on highly visible threats typically concentrated in urban set-
tings, such as illicit drug trafficking, driveby shootings, and
gang warfare.2 To the perpetrators of such acts, the public has
managed some measure of reasoned response, however success-
ful or ineffectual. Trade-in programs exchange guns for cash,
food, and highly desirable consumer goods.' The so-called "war
on drugs" combines youth education programs, televised public
service announcements, and paramilitary operations designed to
stem the flow of illegal substances at their source.4 Through
1. See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Combatting Violence in America: Crime Affects
All of Us, 60 VITAL SPEECHES 322 (1994); Richard Mott & Deborah Short, Explain-
ing Away the Unacceptable, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1994, at C6 (Letter to the Edi-
tor); Jolie Solomon et al., Waging War in the Workplace, NEWSWEEK, July 19,
1993, at 30.
2. See, e.g., Rachel Ehrenfeld, Whither Colombia, America?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1992, at M5 (Commentary); Jay Mathews, Rash of Shootings Escalates in 'War' on
California Roads, WASH. POST, July 28, 1987, at Al; Alessandra Stanley, Child War-
riors: Los Angeles: All Ganged Up, TIME, June 18, 1990, at 50.
3. See, e.g., Constantine Angelos, Public Supports Gun Buy-Backs, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 27, 1993, at B2; Buy-Back Program Brings in 1,000 Guns, LA. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1991, at A13; Serge F. Kovaleski, Cold Cash for Cold Steel: Bowe's Gun
Trade-In Draws Crowd, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1994, at Al.
4. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, The Partnership for a Drug-Free America Accentuates
the Positive in a New Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at D16; Cindy H.
Finney, Drug Fight Enlisting Students: Discovery 5th Graders Learn To Resist Pres-
sure, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Mar. 26, 1992, at Ki; Saul Friedman, Overseas
U.S. War on Drugs Offers Echoes of Vietnam, NEWSDAY, Sept. 17, 1989, at 6; Gail
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these and other efforts, Americans seek to regain some degree of
control over the forces that touch their daily lives.
Increasingly, however, not only has the Violence extended its
reach to the seemingly undefilable realms of suburban elites,5
but another breed of social deviant has captured the imagmation
and heightened the fears of middle class America. Sexual offend-
ers commit millions of acts of molestation, assault, and rape
each year.6 Their crimes leave no bullet wounds or track
marks-a violence all the more threatening for its silence-but
the victims of sex offenders suffer for a lifetime. Adding to the
outrage, these victims consist primarily of those considered
among the most vulnerable within our society--school-aged
children physically and emotionally unprepared to protect them-
selves against such threats. For precisely these reasons, the
American public has again perceived a frightening loss of control
and has again responded.
On September 13, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Vio-
lent Offender Registration Act (the "Federal Registration Act"),
a portion of the administration's long-awaited and hotly debated
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.' The Federal
Registration Act requires the states to establish programs under
which persons classified as sexually violent predators and per-
sons having committed sexually violent offenses against minors
must register with designated law enforcement agencies.9 Non-
Hagans, The Truth About DARE: It Helps Kids Say No, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Feb. 8, 1993, at J1.
5. See, e.g., Jill Smolowe, Danger in the Safety Zone, TIME, Aug. 23, 1993, at 29.
6. For 1993, the U.S. Justice Department reported 140,930 incidents of attempted
and completed rape alone. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PUB. NO. NCJ-148211, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 246
(1993).
7. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
8. Id. §§ 10001-330025.
9. The standards provide that upon the release or parole of a sex offender,.state
prison officials or, in the case of probation, the court must inform the offender of
the duty to register and notify law enforcement authorities m writing of residence
address changes within ten days. Id. § 170101(b)(1)(A)(i-lv). The official must then
obtain specific registration information mandated by the statute. Id. §
170101(b)(1)(A)(i). Finally, the sex offender must read and sign a form stating that
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compliance results in the denial of funds allocated under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968.10 While
politically popular, the Act raises a number of constitutional
concerns, from the potentially cruel and unusual nature of the
punishment imposed to the procedural due process rights of the
offender."
This Note examines the Federal Registration Act and likely
judicial interpretations of its provisions under established sub-
stantive due process analysis. It will first trace the develop-
ment of previously existing state laws requiring the registration
of sexual offenders and explore the political forces prompting
passage of such measures. This Note will then discuss state
court interpretations of various state-level registration acts. The
next portion of the Note will argue that certain provisions of
the Federal Registration Act will provoke unconstitutional m-
trusions into the convicted sex offender's private life, specif-
ically the public disclosure provisions, the means of classifying
"4sexually violent predators," and the length of continued regis-
tration. This section will illustrate the need for more clearly
defined standards for classifying sexual offenders and for new
procedures to tailor the length of registration to the period
during which an offender truly endangers public safety Finally,
the Note will conclude that sinple, yet significant, amendments
to constitutionally vulnerable provisions of the Federal Regis-
tration Act would allow the statute to survive the scrutiny of
judicial review
STATE LEVEL SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS
When President Clinton signed the Federal Registration Act
in September 1994, existing laws already required sexual offend-
ers to register with law enforcement officials in more than thirty
the duty to register has been fully explained. Id. § 17OiOl(b)(1)(A)(v).
10. Id. § 170101(f).
ii. See, e.g., In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (limiting the use of a similar
California statute because its requirements violated constitutional protections against
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to certain offenders); In re Birch, 515 P.2d
12 (Cal. 1973) (requiring courts to advise defendants of the requirements of
California's registration statute before accepting a guilty plea when conviction would
result, in the duty to register).
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states, 2 and proposed legislation m others promised to increase
the total.13 California's statute, 4 prowding for the registration
of any individual convicted of a sexual offense in that state after
July 1, 1944,1" ranks among the oldest examples of this class of
legislation. 6 Typical of such measures, the California law re-
quires sex offenders convicted of any of a specifically enumerat-
ed list of sexual offenses 7 to furnish the local police chief or
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200 to -203 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010-
.100 (Supp. 1994), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3824 (1989 & Supp. 1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290-
290.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (Supp. 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21-.23 (West Supp.
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8311 (Supp.
1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1994); IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-12 (Bums Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4910
(Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500-.540 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994);
LA. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540-549 (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-
A, §§ 11001-11004 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -507 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 207.151-1.57 (MAichie 1992 & Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:11-19
(Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2950.01-.99 (Baldwin 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-
30 to -39 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (Supp. 1994); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-
21.5 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to -298.3 (Michie Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130-.140 (West Supp. 1995); W VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-
1 to -8 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. §§ 7-
19-301 to -306 (Supp. 1994).
13. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1995).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290-290.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
15. Id. § 290(a).
16. Although the California Penal Code has included a registration statute for de-
cades, state lawmakers have amended the exact provisions of the statute as recently
as 1994. Id. § 290.
17. Id. § 290(a)(2). These offenses include kidnapping of a child under age 14, id.
§ 207(b); assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, rape in con-
cert with another, lascivious act upon a child, or penetration of the genitals or anus
with a foreign object, id. § 220(b); sexual battery, rd. § 243.4; rape of a mentally
disordered or developmentally or physically disabled individual, id. § 261(a)(1); rape
or spousal rape accomplished by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
bodily injury, td. §§ 261(a)(2), 262(a)(1); rape of an individual known to be prevented
from resisting because of the influence of drugs or alcohol, zd. § 261(a)(3); rape of an
individual known to be unconscious, td. § 261(aX4); rape under threat of retaliation,
id. § 261(a)(6); sexual intercourse, penetration by a foreign object or substance, oral
copulation, or sodomy with consent procured by false or fraudulent representation
with intent to create fear, td. § 266c; inveiglement or enticement of an unmarried
302
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county sheriff1 s with a current address, 9 fingerprints, and a
photograph, as well as any information deemed necessary by the
state's Department of Justice.0 The statute imposes these same
requirements on persons convicted of similar sexual crimes in
other states who subsequently relocate to California.2 Both the
local authorities and the central Department of Justice maintain
files of this informataon.' Following initial registration at the
time of release, parole, probation, or relocation to the state, sex
offenders must inform law enforcement officials of any changes
of address within ten days of such an occurrence.' Failure to
do so results in mandatory jail sentences that increase in length
depending on the severity of the underlying offense and the
number of prior violations.24 Finally, members of the public can
female under 18 for purposes of prostitution or aiding and abetting in the same, zd.
§ 266; procunng a female for illicit intercourse by false pretenses, td., procurement
of a child under age 16 for lewd or lascivious act, id., abduction of a person under
age 18 for purposes of prostitution, id. § 267; incest, id. § 285; certain instances of
sodomy, id. § 286; lewd or lascivious acts with a child under age 14, id. § 288;
certain instances of oral copulation, id. § 288a; continuous sexual abuse of a child,
id. § 288.5; certain instances of penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign or
unknown objects, zd. § 289; sending or bringing into the state, for sale or distribu-
tion, matter depicting sexual conduct by a minor, zd. § 311.2(b)-(d); printing, exhibit-
ing, distributing, exchanging, possessing, or controlling such matter within the state,
id., employment or use of a minor to perform sexual acts for the preparation of such
matter, id. § 311.4; advertising such matter for sale or distribution, id. § 311.10;
sexual exploitation of a child, zd. § 311.3; annoying or molesting a child under age
18, id. § 647.6; loitering in or about a public toilet for the purpose of engaging in or
soliciting any lewd, lascivious, or unlawful act, td. § 647(d);. indecent exposure, id.
§ 314(1)-(2); causing, encouraging, or contributing to the delinquency of persons un-
der 18 years when lewd and lascivious conduct is involved, id. § 272; certain in-
stances of sending harmful matter with intent to seduce a minor, id. § 288.2; the
attempt to commit any of the listed offenses, id. § 290(a)(2)(B); or any other offense
that the court finds resulted from sexual compulsion or the desire for sexual gratifi-
cation, id. § 290(a)(2)(C).
18. Id. § 290(a)(1).
19. Id. § 290(b)-(d).
20. Id. § 290(e).
21. Id. § 290(a)(2).
22. Id. § 290(b)-(d).
23. Id. § 290(f).
24. If registered following a conviction for most misdemeanors, the offender's in-
tial violation of the registration statute generally constitutes a misdemeanor and
results in a maximum jail term of one year. Id. § 290(g)(1). Subsequent violations
result in a felony conviction and a maximum prison term of three years. Id.
§ 290(g)(3). If registered following a conviction for certain specified misdemeanors,
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call a "900" telephone number to determine whether specific
individuals are registered as sexual offenders.' By providing
the first and last names and middle initial of a registered of-
fender, callers can obtain that individual's physical description,
town of residence, and ZIP code." In addition, the state will de-
scribe the crimes giving rise to the registration duty 
27
As the news media has continued to increase its coverage of
sex crimes, other states have followed California's lead and
passed more stringent sex offender registration statutes.28
These statutes shorten the tune limit for reporting address
changes to authorities.2 1 Some statutorily mandate the collec-
tion of more detailed information.' More importantly, the laws
however, the first violation of the statute results in a maximum prison term of three
years. Id. § 290(g)(2)-(3). Any failure to adhere to the requirements of the registra-
tion statute following a felony conviction constitutes an additional felony, also pun-
ishable by a maximum prison term of three years. Id. § 290(g)(3).
25. Id. § 290.4(a)(3).
26. Id. § 290.4(a)(2)-(3).
27. Id. § 290.4(a)(3).
28. See supra notes 12-13.
29. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22(3)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring notifi-
cation of changes of address 'within 48 hours after arrival at the new place of per-
manent or temporary residence"); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-8 (Burns Supp. 1994) (re-
quiring registration "not more than seven (7) days" after any change of address);
NEV REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.152 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993) (requiring registration
by the sex offender "within 48 hours after his arrival m a county in which he re-
sides or is temporarily present for 48 hours or more").
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010(b) (Supp. 1994) (requiring "the sex
offender's name, address, place of employment, date of birth, each conviction for a
sex offense for which the duty to register has not terminated , date of sex of-
fense convictions, place and court of sex offense convictions, all aliases used, and
driver's license number" as well as fingerprints and a photograph); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 290.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (mandating the collection of blood specimens and
saliva samples for DNA analysis); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22(3)(a)(1) (West Supp.
1995) (requiring the sex offender's "[nlame, social security number, age, race, sex,
date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, photograph, address of legal resi-
dence, address of any current temporary residence, date and place of any employ-
ment, date and place of each conviction, fingerprints, and a brief description of
the crimes committed"); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-6 (Burns Supp. 1994) (requir-
ing the offender's "full name, alias, date of birth, sex, race, height, weight, eye color,
Social Security number, driver's license number, and home address" as well as a
"description of the offense for which the offender was convicted, the date of convic-
tion, and the sentence imposed"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907 (Supp. 1994) (requiring
the offender's name, date of birth, offenses committed, convictions obtained, city or
county of convictions, photograph, fingerprints, and Social Security number); NEV
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enacted m a number of states allow law enforcement officials to
publicize all or a portion of the compiled registration informa-
tion.3 Indeed, some of these newer laws provide law enforce-
ment officials with immunity from any liability that may arise
from the release of such information."
With the increasing popularity and broadening scope of these
statutes, however, come not only a heightened public awareness
REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.153 (Michie 1992) (requiring the sex offender's name, aliases,
a complete description of his person, the offenses committed, the name and location
of any hospital or penal institution to which he was committed for each listed of-
fense, and a current address, including how long the offender has resided there, how
long he expects to reside there, and how long he expects to remain in the county
and in the state); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-4(b) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the sex
offender's name, Social Security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight,
hair and eye color, address of legal and current temporary residence, date and place
of employment, date and place of each conviction, adjudication or acquittal by reason
of insanity, indictment number, fingerprints, and a description of the crimes giving
rise to registration, as well as any other information deemed necessary by the State
Attorney General); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(2), (5) (West Supp. 1995) (re-
quiring the offender's name, address, date and place of birth, place of employment,
crime for which convicted, date and place of conviction, aliases, Social Security num-
ber, fingerprints, and a photograph).
31. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087 (1994) (allowing the release of "the sex
offender's name, address, photograph, place of employment, date of birth, crime for
which convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, and length of sen-
tence," despite assertions of confidentiality and a prohibition on public disclosure);
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1(e) (1994) (allowing "public inspection" of registration
data); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909 (Supp. 1994) (making registration information
"open to inspection at the sheriffs office by the public and specifically subject to
the provisions of the Kansas open records act"); LA. REV STAT. ANN. § 15:546(A)
(West Supp. 1994) (authorizing criminal justice agencies 'to release relevant and
necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when necessary for
public protection"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-5(a) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing the
release of relevant information necessary for public protection); ND. CENT. CODE §
12.1-32-15(8) (Supp. 1993) (stating that the required registration records are "open to
inspection by the public"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(i) (West Supp. 1995)
(authorizing public agencies "to release relevant and necessary information regarding
sex offenders to the public when necessary for public protection").
32. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:546(B) (West Supp. 1994) (imnumzing law
enforcement officials from "civil liability for damages for any discretionary decision to
release relevant and necessary information," unless that decision resulted from "gross
negligence" or "bad faith"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(3) (West Supp. 1995)
(granting immunity from "civil liability for damages for any discretionary decision to
release relevant and necessary information," unless that decision resulted from "gross
negligence" or "bad faith"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-5(b) (West Supp. 1995) (releasing
authorities from civil liability, unless resulting from "gross negligence" or "bad
faith").
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of the seriousness and prevalence of violent sexual crimes, but
also disturbing stories of social dislocation. Using Washington's
Community Protection Act,3" residents of one town received
word that a convicted sexual offender had entered their commu-
nity They then tracked and publicized his movements, made
threatening phone calls, and vandalized his home.' As a result
of the same Act, another Washington man was refused enroll-
ment m the local school system, evicted from his apartment,
featured in a front-page newspaper story, demed employment,
and finally forced to take refuge in a homeless shelter.' A third
individual targeted by the Act received hate mail, became the
subject of parents' meetings at a local school, and eventually left
the community so opposed to his presence.36
No less disturbing are the signs of questionable political pos-
turing that form the backdrop for a growing number of state
registration laws. On July 29, 1994, Jesse K. Timmendequas, a
twice-convicted sexual offender, molested and murdered seven-
year-old Megan Kanka 7 in Hamilton Township, New Jersey '
Exactly one month later, the lower house of the state legislature
passed seven bills,39 collectively dubbed "Megan's Law,"0
aimed at preventing the recurrence of this undeiably tragic
episode.4' Included among the measures was a proposal for the
registration of released sex offenders. 2 Although some lawmak-
ers admitted that "the bills were vague and half-formed and left
33. WASH. REV CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1995).
34. Mary A. Kircher, Note, Registration of Sexual Offenders: Would Washington's
Scarlet Letter Approach Benefit Minnesota?, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 163, 175
(1992).
35. Danel Golden, Sex-Cons: As Sex Crimes Flood the Courts and the Media,
Communities Are Scrambling To Inform and Protect Themselves, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
4, 1993, (Sunday Magazine), at 12.
36. Id.
37. See Kimberly J. McLann, Trenton Races To Pass Bills on Sex Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at Bi.
38. Ralph Siegel, Police: Suspect Admits Killing Girl, Details Sexual Assault of 7-
Year Old, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 2, 1994, (Local), at 7.
39. McLarm, supra note 37, at B1.
40. See Siegel, supra note 38, at 7.
41. Id.
42. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1995); see also McLarn,
supra note 37, at B1 (discussing passage of the New Jersey bills).
306 [Vol. 37:299
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too many specifics up to the State Attorney General,"43 most,
like State Representative Steven J. Corodemus, decided that
they would "rather err on the side of potential victims and not
on the side of crimmals." 4 Spurred by Assembly Speaker
Chuck Haytalan's declaration of an emergency,45 a majority of
the measures reached the State Senate without public commit-
tee hearings," despite heated floor debates concerning the bills'
equal protection, due process, and ex post facto implications."
The unusual procedures employed to secure the passage of
these bills do not necessarily raise suspicions of political postur-
ing. At the time of the bills' passage, however, several additional
factors pointed to such a possibility Assembly Speaker Haytaian
was then engaged in a close contest for a United States Senate
seat.4" In addition, potentially controversial funding provisions
remained conspicuously absent from the bills.49 Nevertheless,
the Assembly passed nearly all by a unanimous vote.5"
The political benefits of passing sex offender registration legis-
lation have not influenced state lawmakers alone. On the federal
level, Congress had considered the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children Registration Act5' on numerous occasions pri-
or to 1994.52 Tragic events around the nation clearly played
43. McLarn, supra note 37, at B2.
44. Id. (quoting State Rep. Steven J. Corodemus).
45. Russ Bleemer, Assembly to Senate: You Figure Out the Tough Parts, N.J. L.J.,
Sept. 5, 1994, at 5.
46. McLarm, supra note 37, at B2.
47. Bleemer, supra note 45, at 5; see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAY, TREATISE ON' CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 18.1-.4 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(providing an overview of equal protection analysis); 2 id. § 17.1 (giving a general
explanation of procedural due process); id. §§ 15.5-.7 (discussing the fundamentals of
substantive due process); id. § 15.9(b) (reviewing the basics of the Constitution's ex
post facto prohibitions).
48. See McLarn, supra note 37, at B2. Haytaian eventually lost his bid for the
Senate to incumbent Frank Lautenberg. See Iver Peterson, The 1994 Elections: New
Jersey Senator Lautenberg Edges Out Haytaian for 3d Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1994, at B13.
49. Bleemer, supra note 45, at 5.
50. McLarm, supra note 37, at B2.
51. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
52. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H5612, 5614 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (remarks of
Mr. Ramstad in Motion to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 3355, Violent Crime Control
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some role in securing its eventual passage." In fact, Mrs.
Maureen Kanka, mother of young Megan who inspired the New
Jersey bills, stood next to President Clinton on the White House
lawn as he signed the Federal Registration Act into law 54
The political pressures that ensured passage of the Federal
Registration Act also undoubtedly influenced its content. The
federal law combines and expands the most severe state regis-
tration requirements. It imposes an address verification process
on all offenders." Each year, within ten days of receipt, those
registered for offenses against minors must return a
nonforwardable verification form, while those classified as sexu-
ally violent predators must do so every ninety days.56 The Fed-
eral Act requires state law enforcement agencies to share regis-
tration information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.57
Sigmficantly, law enforcement agencies may share that data not
* only with one another, but also with the public, when disclosure
proves necessary to community protection from specific individu-
als.5" In addition, the Act provides immunity from liability for
and Law Enforcement Act of 1993); 140 CONG. REC. S2825 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Durenberger discussing three years of unsuccessful efforts to en-
act the Jacob Wetterling bill); 139 CONG. REC. S6863-64 (daily ed. May 28, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Durenberger discussing the failure of the 102d Congress to pass
the Jacob Wetterling bill as a part of both the Democratic and Republican crime
bills).
53. Congressional debate regarding the bill emphasized a number of highly pub-
licized cases of violent sexual attack. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H5612 (daily ed. July
13, 1994) (Motion to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 3355, Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1993, containing references to the slaying of Polly Klaas);
140 CONG. REC. 32825 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1994) (statement of Sen. Durenberger re-
ferring to both the disappearance of Jacob Wetterling and the abduction and murder
of Polly Klaas) (quoting Christine Spolar & Barbara Vobejda, Grass-Roots Crusaders
Embrace a Mission To Find the Missing, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1994, at A23); 139
CONG. REC. S6863 (daily ed. May 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger describ-
ing the 1989 disappearance of Jacob Wetterling). In addition, the House Report on
the bill itself briefly discusses the story of Jacob Wetterling's abduction. See H.R.
REP NO. 392, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).
54. David Bauman, Crime Victim's Mom: Signing of Crime Bill 'Bittersweet',
GANNETr NEWS SERv., Sept. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
55. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(b)(3), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 170101(b)(2).
58. Id. § 170101(d).
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the good faith conduct of officials releasing such information. 9
Finally, the Federal Registration Act strongly urges the states to
establish registration programs, but, like the New Jersey law,
fails to provide the funds required for their implementation.0
MODERN STATE COURT JURISPRUDENCE: STIGMATIZING THE
OFFENDER
Although the constitutional validity of state statutes mandat-
ing the registration of sex offenders and other convicted crnni-
nals has never reached the Supreme Court under a substantive
due process challenge,6 state courts have addressed, both ex-
plicitly and implicitly, the implications of such laws on convicted
sex offenders' right to privacy 62 Judicial analysis of the regis-
tration statutes under a number of constitutional theories has
produced varying opinions regarding their effect on privacy
rights. Certain differences among these opinions may arise from
the individual provisions of the statute at issue. Others reflect
confusion over the constitutional status of these increasingly
popular laws. Each judicial perspective merits some examination
in an analysis of the Federal Registration Act under substantive
due process theory
In re Birch,' a 1973 decision by the Supreme Court of Cali-
forma, used the Califorma Constitution's right to counsel to
examine the validity of a guilty plea entered by an unrepresent-
ed defendant without notice that such a plea would subject him
to the requirements of the state's sex offender registration stat-
59. Id. § 170101(e).
60. Id. § 170101; see supra text accompanying note 49.
61. The Supreme Court has examined the constitutional ramifications of criminal
registration statutes only once, reaching its decision to invalidate the law at issue
on procedural due process grounds. Lambert v. Califorma, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); see
znfra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale behind the Lam-
bert decision).
62. See, e.g., In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983); In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12 (Cal.
1973); People v. Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Adams, 581
N.E.2d 637 (Ill. 1991); State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also
Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F Supp. 666, 679-82 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding privacy
concerns relevant to an ex post facto challenge to New Jersey's registration law).
63. 515 P.2d 12.
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ute.' When Birch pled guilty to the charge of lewd and disso-
lute conduct for urinating in public, he apparently expected no
greater punishment than the five-day suspended sentence im-
posed by a municipal judge.65 He had not been advised that the
obligation to register as a sex offender would also result.66 In
setting aside the plea, the state supreme court noted that
"[a]lthough he stigma of a short jail sentence should eventually
fade, the ignominious badge carried by the convicted sex offend-
er can remain for a lifetime." 7 The court thus subtly recognized
that registration constitutes more than an administrative mcon-
vemence. Its decision acknowledged that the statute's require-
ments inplicated the offender's privacy, exposing him to commu-
nity scrutiny Indeed, the opinion of the court noted that in
enacting the measure, the legislature intended to impose "con-
tinual police surveillance"68 on the convicted sex offender, such
that "[w]henever any sex crime occurs in hs area, the registrant
may very well be subjected to investigation.'69
In 1978, a California appellate court explicitly examined the
state's registration requirements in light of the U.S.
Constitution's substantive due process requirements. In People
v. Mills, ° the defendant was convicted of the crime of lewd and
lascivious conduct on a child less than fourteen years old after
fondling and attempting sexual intercourse with a seven-year-
old girl.71 In addition to the short jail term and a longer proba-
tionary period imposed by the trial court, the California Penal
Code required the defendant to register as a convicted sex of-
fender.7" When Mills claimed on appeal that the registration
requirement violated his right to privacy,73 the court admitted
64. Id. at 12-13.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 17
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
71. Id. at 412-13.
72. Id., see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (reqming sex
offender registration).
73. Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
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that the statute may result in the violation of that freedom. 4
However, without offering any justification for its opinion, the
court stated that "any person who physically molests, in a
sexual sense, a seven-year-old child, has waived any right to
privacy " As a result, the court looked only for a rational basis
for the legislature's action 6 and concluded that the invasion of
a sex offender's right to privacy "is proper and in the exercise of
the state's fundamental right to enact laws which promote pub-
lic health, welfare and safety "7
Five years later, in In re Reed," the Supreme Court of Cali-
forma held the same registration statute unconstitutional as
applied to individuals convicted of lewd or dissolute conduct in a
public place. 9 In Reed, the defendant faced three years of pro-
bation and potentially lifelong registration as a sex offender
following his conviction on the charge of soliciting lewd or disso-
lute conduct from an undercover vice officer in a public
restroom. 0 Although the defendant petitioned the court to in-
validate the registration law for infringing his right to priva-
cy,8' the decision on appeal rested on the defendant's argument
that application of the registration requirement to his case con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment under the California
Constitution. 2 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court
echoed its earlier sentiments in In re Birch, alluding to the "life-
long stigma" imposed on sex offenders by the registration re-
quirementY Once again, the court implicitly recognized the
consequences of registration on the convicted sex offender's pn-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
79. Id. at 222.
80. Id. at 217.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 222. Significantly, the court's finding that the registration requirement
imposed a punishment disproportionate to the defendant's crime rested in part on
both the possibility of perpetual harassment by law enforcement officials and the
lack of any provision for expungement of the initial registration following a release
from the ongoing obligation to register. Id. at 218-19; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, §
17 (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines).
83. Reed, 663 P.2d at 222.
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vacy Further, the majority noted that "[a]part from the bother
and loss of privacy which mere registration entails, the 'ready
availability' to the police, if it serves its purpose, presumably
means a series of command performances at lineups."84
Paradoxically, while arguing to uphold the registration law,
Justice Richardson's dissent in Reed also highlighted the impli-
cations of the statute's requirements for the right to privacy He
urged judicial restraint in the consideration of legislatively de-
termined criminal punishments, but nevertheless argued that
"[c]ompliance with the registration requirement involves
only the barest minimum intrusion or restriction upon personal
freedom or privacy "' Although this statement downplays the
extent of any invasion of the right to privacy, it nonetheless
admits that the infringement of a substantive personal right
results from the imposition of the registration requirement.
Finally, in finding the statute constitutional, Justice Richardson
relied heavily on the confidential nature of the information ob-
tamed from registering offenders."6 Justice Richardson's dis-
senting opinion in Reed thus warrants some consideration in an
analysis of the constitutionality of the Federal Registration Act's
more extensive public disclosure provisions.
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Illinois reached the opposite
conclusion of the Reed majority when it examined the constitu-
tionality of a registration law nearly identical to the California
statute. The Illinois court upheld the statute in the face of a
challenge under the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment and the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of both the Federal and Illinois Constitutions.87
In People v. Adams,' the defendant did not allege any infringe-
ment of substantive due process rghts.8 9 The opinion of the Illi-
84. Id. at 218 (quoting Otto M. Kaus & Ronald E. Mallen, The Misguiding Hand
of Counsel-Reflections on "Crtminal Malpractice," 21 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1222
(1974)).
85. Id. at 223 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 224. But cf. supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (providing the cur-
rent version of the California statute, which allows public access to some information).
87. People v Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 637-38 (l. 1991); see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
730, para. 150 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1994) (Habitual Child Sex Offender Regis-
tration Act).
88. 581 N.E.2d 637
89. The constitutional basis for the defendant's appeal rested on the Eighth
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nois court nevertheless foreshadowed its probable decision if
faced with such a claim in the future.
The defendant m Adams pled guilty to criminal sexual assault
in connection with an incident involving his twelve-year-old
daughter.0 Sentenced to three years in prison, Adams also
faced registration under the state's Habitual Child Sex Offender
Registration Act.9 In response to the defendant's argument
that compliance with the statute would socially stigmatize him,
the court asserted that the possibility of stigmatization arose not
from the requirements of the registration law, but rather from
the defendant's own actions in assaulting ns daughter.2 The
court noted that any information obtained through the
defendant's registration already appeared in the public record
and concluded that "[tihe Registration Act simply makes that
information more readily available to the police." 3 Finally, the
majority emphasized that the law prohibited law enforcement
officials from sharing registration information with the public
and reasoned that without publication, stigmatization could not
occur.94 Such a conclusion has important ramifications for the
constitutional validity of the Federal Registration Act.9"
In the 1992 case of State v. Taylor," the Washington Court
of Appeals faced an ex post facto challenge to the state's sex
offender registration law " The law not only applied to previ-
ously convicted sex offenders, but also allowed unrestricted pub-
lic dissemination of the information obtained." Convicted of at-
tempted indecent liberties, the defendant appealed the imposi-
tion of the registration requirement because the statute had
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the equal pro-
tection and procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 640.
90. Id. at 639.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 641.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See tnfra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the public notifica-
tion provisions of the Federal Registration Act and their role m any determination
of the Act's constitutionality).
96. 835 P.2d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
97. Id. at 246.
98. Id.
1995] 313
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
become effective three months after he committed his crime.9
The majority in Taylor upheld the constitutionality of the
law's retroactive application. The court recognized the stigmatiz-
ing effect of the registration requirement,' but concluded that
the defendant's conviction for a sexual offense constituted the
original source of that stigmatization. 1 Further, its opinion
noted that "it is unlikely that the additional dissemination of the
information brought about by registration will significantly in-
crease the stigmatic effect over what it would be absent any
registration requirement."'0 2 The court's acknowledgement of
the possibility of some stigmatization proves particularly impor-
tant, however, in light of the fact that federal lawmakers mod-
eled the Federal Registration Act on the Washington statute.' 3
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS DENIED: WHEN PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Existing state court jurisprudence suggests that a portion of
any challenge to the Federal Registration Act must include sub-
stantive due process analysis.0 4 In order to trigger strict scru-
tiny review, a challenger would have to identify a fundamental
right affected by the statute.0" If the reviewing court agreed
with the challenger's classification of the right at issue, the
federal government would have to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest served by the law 0 ' The finding of a
compelling state interest would then necessitate a determination
of whether Congress sufficiently tailored the statute to the
government's interest.0 7
Despite the U.S. House of Representatives' invocation of Peo-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 249. The court noted that "registration makes it likely more persons
will learn of the conviction." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See 140 CONG. REC. H5612 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (Motion to Instruct Con-
ferees on H.R. 3355, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993).
104. See supra notes 61-102 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (following Court decisions
employing strict scrutiny review m cases involving fumdamental rights).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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ple v. Adams... and People v. Mills. 9 to demonstrate that
"registration requirements do not violate the constitutional
right[] to privacy,"" ° Adams, Mills, and other decisions suggest
that an individual's fundamental right to privacy provides the
first, and perhaps most obvious, basis for an examination of the
Federal Registration Act under substantive due process theo-
ry ' The Act provides for the disclosure of registration infor-
mation to a broad segment of the law enforcement commum-
ty"2 and, importantly, to the general public to the extent "nec-
essary to protect the public concerning a specific person.""'
The likelihood of such widespread disclosure raises the specter
of government-sponsored intrusions into the sex offender's pr-
vate life."'
Although the Constitution does not explicitly establish a sub-
stantive right to privacy, the Supreme Court identified such a
right in its 1965 decision, Griswold v. Connecticut."' Drawing
on the various freedoms expressly guaranteed in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments,"' the Court in
Griswold recognized the legitimacy of the right to privacy," a
right "older than the Bill of Rights.""' In subsequent years,
the Court continued to invoke a fundamental right to privacy in
a highly 'controversial, yet enduring, series of cases."' The
108. 581 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. 1991).
109. 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
110. H-R. REP No. 392, 103d Cong., ist Sess. 4 & n.10 (1993).
111. See supra notes 61-102 and accompanying text.
112. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(b)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
113. Id. § 170101(d)(3).
114. Intrusion into the private life of a sex offender may seem inherently justifiable
to proponents of the Federal Registration Act. As the court in Reed pointed out,
however, "[a] felon convicted of [robbery, burglary, or arson] may serve his time and
be done with it." In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal. 1983). Under the Federal Act,
however, a sex offender may serve a full prison sentence as punishment for the
crimes committed and yet remain subject to limitations on his or her right to priva-
cy. This reality represents the underlying basis for any challenge to the law.
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. Id. at 484.
117. Id. at 485.
118. Id. at 486.
119. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing the right to
marry as part of the right to privacy in invalidating a Wisconsin statute requiing
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constitutionally protected right to privacy has thus become a
fixture of Supreme Court jurisprudence in cases as diverse as
Roe v. Wade2 ' and Zablocki v. Redhail.1
21
Despite the variety of its right to privacy decisions, the Court
has never addressed the implications of that right for statutes
that, like the Federal Registration Act, allow full public disclo-
sure of detailed personal information. The Court's support of
state court decisions that merely suggest that the sex offender
registration statutes impact and indeed infringe upon the right
to privacy thus remains in doubt.
In Paul v. Davis,22 the Supreme Court addressed the consti-
tutional concerns raised by community notification of an
individual's arrest on shoplifting charges." Local authorities
had distributed a flier to area businesses providing the names
and photographs of "active" shoplifters. 24 The flier identified
the petitioner as a member of that group,' but a court subse-
quently dismissed the shoplifting charge against hnn.' Never-
theless, the Supreme Court held that the distribution of the
fliers had not infringed on the petitioner's right to privacy'
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist limited privacy
right protections to "matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa-
tion."" He thus concluded that the petitioner's claim rested
solely on an assertion that "the State may not publicize a record
of an official act such as an arrest." 9 Because prior case law
court approval prior to the marriage of any state resident paying child support);
Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (reaffirmung the existence of a
right to privacy in declaring unconstitutional a New York statute restricting the
sale, distribution, advertisement, and display of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (acknowledging a right of personal privacy in striking down Texas's
criminal abortion statutes).
120. 410 U.S. 113.
121. 434 U.S. 374.
122. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
123. Id. at 694-95.
124. Id. at 695.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 696.
127 Id. at 713.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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failed to support that proposition, the five-to-three majority re-
jected the privacy claim outright.3 °
The outcome in Paul, however, does not eliminate the possibil-
ity of a challenge to the Federal Registration Act on privacy
grounds. First, the governmental action at issue in Paul differs
to a significant degree from the disclosure allowed by the Regis-
tration Act. In Paul, the law enforcement authorities distributed
a limited amount of information to a rather small group of inter-
ested storeowners. This scenario contrasts sharply with the pos-
sibility of detailed personal data becoming available to any
member of the public under the federal sex offender registration
statute. 3' Second, one year after Paul, the Supreme Court con-
sidered a law remarkably sinilar to the Federal Registration
Act.' 2 Whalen v. .Roe modified the Court's position as an-
nounced m Paul and recogmzed a more expansive privacy
right.13
The plaintiffs m Whalen challenged the constitutionality of a
130. Id. at 714.
131. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(b)(1), 108 Stat. 1796, 2039-40 (1994) (requiring state officials to obtain the
sex offender's fingerprints, photograph, name, identifying factors, anticipated future
residence, offense history, and documentation of any psychiatric treatment received).
132. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591-93 (1977). The New York law at issue pro-
vided that:
[P]rescnption[s for controlled substances] shall be prepared in tnpli-
cate The original and both copies must contain the following:
(a) the name, address, and age of the ultimate user for whom the sub-
stance is intended
(b) the name, address, registration number, telephone number, and hand-
written signature of the prescribing practitioner,
(c) specific directions for use, including but not limited to the dosage and
frequency of dosage and the maximum daily dosage;
(d) the date upon which such prescription was actually signed by the
prescribing practitioner.
Act of June 8, 1972, ch. 878, § 3332(2), 1972 N.Y. Laws 2608, 2629 (current version
at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3332(2) (Consol. 1987)). The law further mandated that:
A practitioner dispensing a substance which may be prescribed only upon
an official New York state prescription must at the time of such dispens-
ing prepare an official New York prescription The practitioner shall
retain the original for a period of five years and shall file the two copies
with the [state health] department
Id. § 3331(6) (current version at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3331(6) (Consol. 1987)).
133. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
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New York law requiring physicians to file an official form with
the New York State Department of Health when prescribing
drugs classified as dangerous." 4 This law required the form to
provide the name of the physician, the pharmacy used, the drug,
the dosage prescribed, and the name, address, and age of the
patient.'35 The plaintiffs claimed that misuse of this informa-
tion would stigmatize them as drug addicts."6 Significantly,
while concluding that the possibility of misuse remained suffi-
ciently unlikely to justify invalidation of the statute," a unan-
imous Court found that the right to privacy protected not only
the limited interests identified by Justice Rehnquist in Paul, but
also "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters." 8
The Court in Whalen declined to "decide any question which
might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulat-
ed private data-whether intentional or unintentional.""9
However, the decision provides ample justification for concluding
that the Court would classify the personal information obtained
under the Federal Registration Act as "private data." Further,
Whalen indicates that the Court would likely prove receptive to
the notion that widespread disclosure of this information impli-
cates the fundamental right to privacy 1
40
134. Id. at 591-93.
135. Id. at 593.
136. Id. at 595.
137 Id. at 600-02.
138. Id. at 599.
139. Id. at 605-06.
140. Mary A. Kircher argues that the disclosure of information regarding sex of-
fenders does not implicate the right to privacy because it constitutes both the publi-
cation of public records and the publication of matters of legitimate public interest.
Kircher, supra note 34, at 172-74. Although grounded in the Supreme Court's defa-
mation jurisprudence, this analysis proves inapplicable to sex offender registration.
In the area of sex offender registration, the central issue does not concern records
obtained through court proceedings and open to public inspection, but rather the
purposeful consolidation and active broadcast of data designed to maintain constant
public vigilance over the activities of registered individuals. While a legitimate public
interest in this information exists, this Note will demonstrate that any governmental
action must balance that interest with the rights of the individuals involved. But see
Doe v Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 406-11 (N.J. 1995) (rejecting a convicted offender's claim
that New Jersey's registration law violated his right to privacy because he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding matters of public record or matters ex-
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Under substantive due process analysis, the threshold finding
of a fundamental right justifies analysis of the registration
statute's constitutionality under the heightened strict scrutiny
standard of review 141 Under strict scrutiny review, the state
must justify any action infringing on a fumdamental right by
demonstrating that the action both serves a compelling govern-
mental interest and is narrowly tailored to the fulfillment of
that interest.4
2
Protection Through Public Disclosure: The State's Compelling
Interest
In order to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the government could easily identify a compelling govern-
mental interest served by the registration of sex offenders. In-
deed, in arguing for the validity of the Registration Act, the
state presumably need only point to the tragic molestation and
murder of Megan Kanka, the slaying of Polly Klaas, 144 and
the unsolved disappearance of Jacob Wetterling45 to convince
the Court of the compelling interest served by the Federal Regis-
tration Act.
The statements of legislative purpose accompanying state reg-
istration statutes provide additional and more reasoned bases
for the enactment of such laws. The stated purposes are to: (1)
enhance public safety,46 (2) protect the public from sex offend-
ers, 47 (3) "deter the commission of repeat sex offenses and sex
posed to public view and finding that the state's interest m public disclosure out-
weighed his interest in limiting the dissemination of private information under the
state's notification law).
141. See generally Roe v.*Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) and the cases cited thereto.
142. Id.
143. See generally Siegel, supra note 38 (describing the details of Megan's abduc-
tion, the community's search for the girl, and Jesse Timmendequas's confession).
144. See generally 140 CONG. REC. S2825 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Durenberger) (quoting Christine Spolar & Barbara Vobejda, Grass-Roots Crusad-
ers Embrace a Misswn To Find the Misszng, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1994, at A23).
145. See generally H.R. REP. No. 392, 103d Cong., ist Sess. 3 (1993) (explaning
the background of the Jacob Wetterling Crines Against Children Registration Act);
139 CONG. REC. S6863 (daily ed. May 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger)
(introducing the registration bill and describing the abduction of Jacob Wetterling).
146. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.22 (West Supp. 1995).
147. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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offenses involving physical violence,"148  (4) "enhance law
enforcement's ability to react when violent or repeat sex offenses
are committed," '149 (5) "prevent[] and promptly resolv[e] inci-
dents involving sexual abuse and missing persons,"'5 ° and (6)
"collect and analyze statistical and informational data for morn-
tonng and tracking purposes.''
State courts have concluded that sex offender registration
statutes address important, perhaps compelling, governmental
interests. For example, in People v. Mills,"52 a Califorma ap-
pellate court asserted the existence of the state's "right to
enact laws which promote public health, welfare and safe-
ty 1" In People v. Monroe,' another Califoria appellate
court identified children as a "'class of victims who require
paramount protection.
1 55
As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when examining a Los
Angeles ordinance requiring the registration of convicted felons,
the government's police power affords broad opportunities for
action in the interest of preventing harm to the commumty 156
In Lambert v. California, the Court limited that power only by
the requirements of procedural due process; it imposed no other
restrictions on the operation of the ordinance. 57
The House of Representatives sought specifically to justify the
Federal Registration Act as a legitimate exercise of the
government's police power. It reported that the "protection of
children from violence and sex offenses falls clearly within the
Federal government's purview in protecting the health, safety
15:540 (West Supp. 1995).
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22 (West Supp. 1995).
149. Id.
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(b) (West Supp. 1995).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22 (West Supp. 1995).
152. 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
153. Id. at 417
154. 215 Cal. Rptr. 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
155. Id. at 56 (quoting People v Tate, 210 Cal. Rptr. 117, 121 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985)).
156. Lambert v. Califorma, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). While Lambert represents the
only example of a registration statute to reach the Supreme Court, the main issue
in that case concerned whether authorities could convict an unregistered individual
absent notice of the duty to do so. See id. at 227.
157 Id. at 228.
320 [Vol. 37:299
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
and welfare of its citizens."58 Further, the House of Represen-
tatives reported that its purpose in enacting the Federal Regis-
tration Act was "[t]o address crimes of violence and molesta-
tion," 9 "to deter repeat offenses and protect children from
victimization,"60 and to assist in the monitoring of sex offend-
ers, convicted in one state, who subsequently relocate to anoth-
er. 6 ' These aims, nearly identical to those justifying state reg-
istration statutes, would likely gain similar judicial approval as
compelling state interests.
A more important implication for any right to privacy analysis
of the Federal Registration Act is that such legislative goals pro-
vide compelling justification not only for the registration of sex
offenders, but also for the public release of that information.
Community access to this information, and even active public
notification, would presumably advance the state's asserted pur-
poses by enlisting community assistance in preventing the occur-
rence of sexually violent crime.
Under the broad police powers of the state, Congress's express
reasons for enacting the Federal Registration Act thus likely
represent a compelling governmental interest. By furthering
that interest, the public disclosure provisions of the Federal
Registration Act would also likely satisfy the first prong of the
strict scrutiny standard.
Constitutional Failings Under the "Narrowly Tailored" Prong:
Who Must Register and for How Long?
The second prong of strict scrutiny analysis examines whether
the government has narrowly tailored the challenged law to the
identified compelling interest.'62 To survive judicial review, the
state action at issue must represent the least restrictive means
available for the fulfillment of that interest. 63 This prong of
the test proves substantially more troubling when applied to the
158. H.R. REP. No. 392, 103d Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1993).
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Id. at 4-5.
162. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) and the cases cited theretn.
163. Id. (requnang legislative enactments to be narrowly drawn).
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public disclosure provisions of the Federal Registration Act. Giv-
en the statute's vaguely defined criteria for public disclosure," 4
as well as its provision for immunity from liability for the "good
faith" release of registration information by law enforcement
agencies and state officials,' widespread dissemination of the
data obtained seems likely to occur Indeed, in light of mounting
political pressure for protection from released sex offenders,'
the Act will almost certainly result in liberal community notifi-
cation. Strict scrutiny requires, therefore, that the Federal Reg-
istration Act operate only (1) on those individuals truly deserv-
ing inclusion on the sex offender registry and (2) for that period
of time during which the offender presents a legitimate threat to
the community's health, safety, or welfare. Only subject to these
limitations can the public disclosure provisions of the statute
serve their intended purpose while invading the right to privacy
to the least restrictive degree possible.
Sexually' Violent Offenders and Repeat Behavior
The first group of offenders targeted by the federal legislation
consists in large part of individuals "convicted of a sexually vio-
lent offense."'6 In its initial report on the law, the House of
Representatives pointed to a criminal justice study that "con-
cluded the 'behavior [of child sex offenders] is highly repetitive,
to the point of compulsion,' and found that 74% of imprisoned
child sex offenders had one or more prior convictions for a sexual
offense against a child."6 ' From this study, Congress reasoned
that community monitoring of these offenders would advance the
government's compelling interest in protecting the public from
violent sexual crime against both children and adults. By relying
on such statistics, the lawmakers implicitly asserted that they
164. Violent Crnme Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(d)(3), 108 Stat. 1796, 2042 (1994) (permitting the release of information
"necessary to protect the public").
165. Id. § 170101(e).
166. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
167 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(a)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
168. H.R. REP No. 392, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1993) (citing A Study of the Child
Molester- Myths and Realities, 41 LAE J. AM. CRIM. JUST. ASS'N 17, 22 (1978)).
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had tailored the registration requirements to apply to a narrow
group of individuals prone to repeat offenses. Other studies,
however, have shown that sex offenders exhibit no greater ten-
dency to engage in repeat behavior than other types of offend-
ers.169 Department of Justice statistics indicate that 66% of
robbers, 42.1% of murderers, 54.5% of kidnappers, and 51.5% of
rapists are arrested again within three years of release from
state prisons. 7 ° These statistics demonstrate that the mci-
dence of repeat behavior among at least one class of freed sex
offenders-rapists-appears no greater than that among individ-
uals convicted of other violent crimes.
Viewed in relation to these statistics, the Federal Registration
Act appears arbitrary from two perspectives. On the one hand,
the law proves underinclusive. If the incidence of repeat behav-
ior among sex offenders parallels that among other criminal
classes, a properly tailored law would provide for the registra-
tion of all violent crnnminals, not only sex offenders. On the other
hand, the law is also overinclusive. While the Federal Registra-
tion Act imposes its requirements on all sex offenders,. a large
number of them will not engage in repeat behavior.
Despite the Act's apparent arbitrariness, use of its provisions
to monitor and control sexually violent offenders may still sur-
vive the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny analysis.
The simple fact remains that, unlike murderers, sex offenders
leave no smoking guns. As a result, published statistics regard-
mg repeat sex offenders do not reflect the many instances of
repeat behavior that go unreported and thus unpumshed." A
plethora of anecdotal evidence supports this view One sex of-
169. See, e.g., ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RE-
CIDISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989); Stuart Schemgold et al., The Poli-
tics of Sexual Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual Predator Legislation, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809, 812 (1992); Kircher, supra note 34, at 164.
170. BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 169, at 5 (Table 8).
171. Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing
Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV 709, 745 (1992) (citing BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTICS 232 (1981)); Mane A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Danger-
ousness and Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W L. REV. 277,
296-97 (1992) (citing Mark R. Wemrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes
Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991)).
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fender, convicted of a single incident of molestation, admitted in
prison to having violated thirty children. Another, impris-
oned for the molestation of two young girls, later claimed re-
sponsibility for more than 3,000 incidents of child sexual
abuse.' Despite mild statistical evidence of repeat behavior
among "sexually violent offenders," such claims, whether exag-
gerated or not, justify the assertion that lawmakers have nar-
rowly tailored the Federal Registration Act to preserve commu-
nity safety
Sexually Violent Predators: Unclear Definitions and Unreliable
Predictions
The Federal Registration Act's application to so-called "sexu-
ally violent predator[s]"' must also satisfy the narrowly tai-
lored requirement of strict scrutiny analysis. The Act defines
the "sexually violent predator" as an individual "who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent of-
fenses."'75 The sentencing court determines whether a particu-
lar individual deserves this classification "after receiving a
report by a State board composed of experts in the field of the
behavior and treatment of sexual offenders."'7 The Federal
Act defines the term "mental abnormality" as "a congenital or
acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or
volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes
that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a de-
gree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety
of other persons." 7 Although Congress did not provide any
definition of the term "personality disorder," legislators appar-
ently intended the overall definitional framework to narrow the
Act's application to a constitutionally permissible scope. Never-
172. Golden, supra note 35, at 12.
173. Id.
174. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(a)(1)(B), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
175. Id. § 170101(a)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
176. Id. § 170101(a)(2).
177 Id. § 170101(a)(3)(D).
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theless, medical professionals have severely criticized the use of
the terms "mental abnormality" and "personality disorder" in
state statutes affecting sex offenders. 78
While the Federal Registration Act relies on mental health
experts to assist in judicial determinations of "mental abnormal-
ity," the term lacks any established clinical meaning.179 Indeed,
it does not appear as a recognized psychiatric diagnosis in the
latest edition of the profession's official manual, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) '8 Fur-
ther, the Washington State Psychiatric Association described the
term as "hopelessly vague"'"' when the group argued against
its use in that state's Sexually Violent Predator Statute. As one
mental health professional observed, "'[miental abnormality'
connotes sufficient vagueness that nearly any symptom, deficit,
or historical detail might be included."8 2 Commentators have
also criticized the use of the term "mental abnormality" because
it allows a certain circularity of reasoning.' According to this
argument, the diagnosis of mental abnormality depends on two
facts: (1) the existence of prior sexual offenses and (2) -a predis-
position for the commission of criminal sexual acts;.. however,
only one piece of evidence exists to establish the presence of
both elements-prior sexual offenses." Any conviction for a
sexual crime would thus almost certainly guarantee a finding of
mental abnormality 
86
The drafters of the Model Penal Code recognized that just
such an unfounded diagnosis might result from their use of the
178. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 171, at 727-33; Robert M. Wettstem, M.D., A
Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 597, 601-04 (1992).
179. "See Brooks, supra note 171, at 730 (citation omitted).
180. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MEN-
TAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [heremafter DSM-IV].
181. Brooks, supra note 171, at 730.
182. Wettstem, supra note 178, at 602.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 KAN. L. REV. 887, 908
(1994).
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term "mental disease or defect."18 7 In order to avoid any misap-
plication of that phrase, they specifically stated that "the terms
'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial con-
duct."'88 The Federal Registration Act, however, contains no
such caveat, and the potential for ascribing a "mental abnormal-
ity" to even the most undeserving sex offender looms large.
Unlike the term "mental abnormality," "personality disorder"
is not defined in the Federal Registration Act. However, the
phrase carries some meaning in the psychiatric community 189
In fact, "personality disorders" constitute one of the five axes of
the DSM-J's system for categorizing mental disorders.19 ° In
analyzing the use of that term under Washington's Sexually
Violent Predators Statute, 9 ' mental health professionals have
questioned whether lawmakers intended to incorporate the
term's clinical definition into the law or envisioned some other,
unarticulated standard.'92 Even if the legislature wanted ex-
perts to apply the term's technical meaning when evaluating sex
offenders, the inherent uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis
suggest that application by even the most seasoned professionals
would produce disparate results.'
Some commentators have argued that the judiciary should
accord deference to statutory uses of "mental abnormality" and
"personality disorder" under the theory that, in this context, the
terms relate to legal rather than psychiatric concepts."' As ap-
plied to the Federal Registration Act, however, that contention
contradicts Congress's plain emphasis on the need for a clinical
determination of the existence of either condition in any particu-
lar individual. If lawmakers had intended to employ "mental
187 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
188. Id. § 4.01(b).
189. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 171, at 727; Wettstern, supra note 178, at 603.
190. DSM-IV, supra note 180, at 25.
191. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902 (West 1992). On August 25, 1995, a
U.S. District Court invalidated the law for violating the Federal Constitution's Due
Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. Young v. Weston, No. C94-
480C, 1995 WL 529429, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 1995).
192. See Wettstem, supra note 178, at 603.
193. Id. at 603-04.
194. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 171, at 730.
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abnormality" or "personality disorder" as legal, rather than psy-
chiatric, terms, they presumably would not have provided for
expert evaluations at all. Similarly, if "mental abnormality" and
"personality disorder" carried purely legal connotations, the pre-
siding judge would be the most qualified individual to apply the
terms, and no need for outside consultation would arise. Instead,
the statute explicitly defers any judicial decision on the matter
until after receipt of "a report by a State board composed of
experts in the field of the behavior and treatment of sexual of-
fenders."'95 Judicial deference cannot excuse a lack of legisla-
tive clarity when legislators evidently intended individuals out-
side the legal system to apply the terms at issue.
While use of the phrases "personality disorder" and "mental
abnormality" initially appears to lend scientific precision to the
identification of sexually violent predators, closer analysis re-
veals the inadequacies of congressional attempts to tailor the
statute to conform to the constitutional requirements imposed on
any exercise of the state's police powers. Indeed, neither term
seems capable of providing a sound and consistently accurate
justification for including an individual in the "sexually violent
predator" category and requiring registration. Absent a sound
basis for applying the statute, public disclosure of the personal
information obtained necessarily constitutes an unwarranted
invasion of the sex offender's constitutional right to privacy The
government has not narrowly tailored the possible release of
such private data to information about individuals posing a
genuine threat to public health, safety, or welfare. The provision
relating to "sexually violent predators" must therefore fail the
second prong of the strict scrutiny standard.'96
A second aspect of the Federal Registration Act's definition of
"sexually violent predators" merits close examination under the
"narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny analysis. According to
195. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(a)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
196. While a judicial invalidation of the Act's "sexually violent predator" provisions
would still subject the offender to registration for the violent sexual crime commit-
ted, it would eliminate both the heightened address verification procedure and the
potential for lifelong registration currently in force. See id. §. 170101(b)(3), (6); supra
notes 167-73 and accompanying text; infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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the Act, "[tihe term 'sexually violent predator' means a person
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent
offenses."197 Again, the sentencing court makes this determina-
tion, guided by a board of mental health professionals."8 In
drafting this definition of the "sexually violent predator," Con-
gress apparently assumed that experts can accurately predict
the recidivism of individual sex offenders. Reliable predictions
would allow the Federal Registration Act to target a select group
of particularly dangerous individuals. The statute would thus
achieve the government's compelling interest in community pro-
tection using sufficiently narrow means. 9'
Members of the psychiatric community, however, have in-
creasingly questioned the accuracy of such predictions.2 00 In
fact, "[it has been widely accepted for some tune that predic-
tions of an individual's likelihood of committing future serious
violent crime are only one-third accurate." °' Because of this
inaccuracy, only one of every three offenders labelled "sexually
violent predators" will actually recidivate. However, the Federal
Registration Act requires all three to register with law enforce-
ment authorities and thus subject themselves to the twin possi-
bilities of public disclosure and loss of privacy 202
197 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(a)(3)(C), 108 Stat. 1796, 2039 (1994) (emphasis added).
198. Id. § 170101(a)(2).
199. This analysis differs from the preceding section's discussion of repeat behavior
to the extent that the issue of actual instances of repeat behavior differs from the
question of accuracy m predicting that behavior.
200. See Beth K. Fujimoto, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional Pa-
rameters for Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV 879, 898 n.114 (1992) (relying on data indicating that mental health profes-
sionals overpredict dangerousness); Wettstem, supra note 178, at 605 (emphasizing
the difficulties of predicting future violent behavior); Bochnewich, supra note 171, at
293-96 (pointing out the difference between the standard of proof required to find
an individual dangerous and the level of unacceptable risk society chooses to define
as dangerous). But see Brooks, supra note 171, at 739-50 (arguing that methodologi-
cal flaws in recidivism studies have overstated the inaccuracy of dangerousness
predictions).
201. Bochnewich, supra note 171, at 293-94.
202. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 170101(a)(1)(B), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994).
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While seemingly overinclusive, this portion of the Federal
Registration Act should nevertheless satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirements of strict scrutiny review In a variety of contexts,
the Supreme Court has approved judicial reliance on expert pre-
dictions of future dangerousness. 3 The Court has generally
acquiesced in legislative decisions to define future dangerous-
ness in terms of its probability, rather than its actual occur-
rence. 4 In addition, in analyzing this portion of the Act, the
Court would likely acknowledge that, as discussed, reported in-
stances of sex offender recidivism substantially underrepresent
actual incidents of repeat behavior." 5 For both of these rea-
sons, the Supreme Court should find that while problems re-
main with the "sexually violent predator" classification, at least
this portion of the Federal Registration Act-basing registration
on predictions of recidivism-satisfies the narrowly tailored
requirement of strict scrutiny analysis.
Length of Registration and the Retention of Records
Perhaps the most serious constitutional flaws of the Federal
Registration Act lie in (1) its provisions establishing the length
of tune during which convicted sex offenders have a duty to
provide updated personal information to law enforcement offi-
cials and (2) the absence of any procedure for purging registra-
tion records when that duty has ended. Sigmficantly, in Whalen
v. Roe,2 °6 the Supreme Court upheld New York's prescription
203. Bochnewich, supra note 171, at 283-93 (discussing the use of predictions of
dangerousness in pretrial detention, sentencing, parole release decisions, and the in-
voluntary commitment of insanity acquittees); see also United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987) (approving consideration of the possibility of future criminal conduct
in decisions to deny bail); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (allowing predicted
dangerousness to justify the pretrial detention of juveniles); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding reliance on
predictions of dangerousness in parole determinations).
204. See, e.g., Bochnewich, supra note 171, at 293. According to the logic of this
definition, the two of three anticipated recidivists who do not fulfill expert predic-
tions within a defined period still pose a threat to the community, but have tempo-
rarily succeeded in thwarting their own recidivistic tendencies. See id. at 296 (corn-
paring sex offenders to bombs, dangerous whether or not they actually explode)
(citation omitted).
205. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
206. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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drug registration statute only after finding that the law express-
ly prohibited disclosure of the information obtained, °7 making
the potential for such disclosure remote 8 and that the legisla-
tion required the destruction of the collected data after a period
of five years.0 9
Both the length of registration and the absence of any
expungement process determine the period during which private
data remains subject to public disclosure; thus, each also impli-
cates the right to privacy According to the Federal Registration
Act, sexually violent offenders must register with law enforce-
ment authorities for ten years.2 10 The statute's legislative his-
tory provides no justification for choosing this length of time.21
Lacking any provisions for early release from the duty to regis-
ter, the law indicates that not even affirmative evidence of total
rehabilitation would allow authorities to terminate the registra-
tion requirement prior to the ten-year mark.
The Federal Registration Act easily might allow offenders to
petition law enforcement authorities to reconsider the need for
registration at any point during the ten-year period. The statute
could provide for a hearing, similar to that used in making pa-
role decisions, in which the offender could present evidence of
reform. Even if the offender's attempt to secure a release proved
unsuccessful, the reevaluation process would more narrowly
tailor the Act's registration requirement to that period during
which the offender legitimately threatens community health,
safety, and welfare.
As currently formulated, the law imposes too heavy a burden
on the sex offender's right to privacy In an indeterminate num-
ber of cases, registration will continue well past the point when
monitoring a particular individual would further the
government's interest in protecting the commumty from violent
sexual crime. Even when no longer dangerous, the offender re-
mains subject to public disclosure and the related threat of pn-
207 Id. at 594.
208. Id. at 601-02.
209. Id. at 593.
210. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(b)(6)(A), 108 Stat. 1796, 2041 (1994).
211. See H.R. REP No. 392, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).
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vacy right infringements.
At least one state legislature has recognized the potential
problem that arises from requiring registration beyond the pen-
od of its utility and has modified its statutory scheme according-
ly The California Penal Code provides that a court, "in its dis-
cretion and the interests of justice,"12 can release qualified pe-
titioners from the penalties and disabilities related to any felony
conviction213 and must release qualified petitioners from the
penalties and disabilities related to misdemeanor convic-
tions.1 4 In addition, the California Code enables qualified indi-
viduals to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon
after only three years residency in the state.
215
The Supreme Court of California has specifically referred to
the possibilities of release and rehabilitation in considering the
constitutional validity of individual applications of the state's
registration statute.1 6 In In re Birch,"' the court identified
the release procedure as one factor mitigating, but not eliminat-
ing, the unconstitutional effect of allowing a defendant to plead
guilty to a sexual offense without notice of the registration du-
ty 211 The court in In re Reed 219 implicitly acknowledged that
the release process bolstered the constitutional legitimacy of
applying the law to individuals convicted of lewd or dissolute
conduct in a public place."0 Most recently, in People v.
212. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a) (West Supp. 1995).
213. Id. § 1203.4. A California appellate court first confirmed the application of this
section to the state's sex 'offender registration statute mn Kelly v. Municipal Court,
324 P.2d 990, 994-95 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Another California state appellate
court reached the same conclusion m Bradford v. State, Ill Cal. Rptr. 852, 853, 855
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973). Presumably, a court would only exercise tis discretion m the
sex offender context when the individual no longer endangers public safety.
214. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a) (West Supp. 1995).
215. Id. § 4852.01(a). Significantly, the California legislature amended this section
in 1994 to apply not only to convicted felons, but also to "any person who is convict-
ed of a nusdemeanor violation of any sex offenses specified m [the state's sex offend-
er registration statute]." Id. § 4852.01(c) (emphasis added).'
216. See, e.g., People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 745 n.7 (Cal. 1993); In re Reed,
663 P.2d 216, 218-19 (Cal. 1983); In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 17 & n.9 (Cal. 1973).
217. 515 P.2d 12.
218. Id. at 17 & n.9.
219. 663 P.2d 216.
220. Id. at 218-19.
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McClellan,"1 the court identified the possibility of both release
and rehabilitation as factors that allowed a guilty plea to stand
when the defendant failed to raise a timely objection to-the trial
court's failure to advise him of the registration duty
Proponents of the Federal Registration Act might argue that
registration occasionally reaching beyond the period of actual
dangerousness poses no real constitutional question because
courts routinely impose prison sentences without the possibility
of parole. Although worthy of consideration, this argument ig-
nores the main focus of the Federal Registration Act. The
statute's legislative history clearly indicates that the law's pr-
mary purpose in requiring violent sexual offenders to register
lies not in imposing punishment, but in monitoring offenders to
prevent repeat behavior.' Although a prison sentence contin-
ues to serve its overriding punitive function even after full reha-
bilitation, the registration statute does not achieve any of its
stated goals when the possibility of repeat behavior disappears.
This provision of the Act thus cannot fulfill strict scrutiny's
narrow tailoring requirement because it subjects offenders to
public notification and privacy right violations without further-
ing the state's compelling interests.
The Federal Registration Act requires the registration of sexu-
ally violent predators during a differently defined, but equally
suspect, period. The Act mandates that the registration of a
sexually violent predator "shall terminate upon a determina-
tion that the person no longer suffers from a mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder that would make the person likely
to engage in a predatory sexually violent offense."'
On the one hand, this portion of the legislation provides a
definite standard for terminating the registration duty of de-
serving individuals. It takes account of the unique circumstanc-
es giving rise to each offender's crime and recognizes that
every individual responds differently to psychiatric treatment.
Thus, it narrowly tailors registration to a period during which
221. 862 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1993).
222. Id. at 745 n.7, 749.
223. See, e.g., H.R. REP No. 392, 103d Cong., ist Sess. 4 (1993).
224. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(b)(6)(B), 108 Stat. 1796, 2041 (1994).
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public disclosure of the information obtained would most bene-
fit law enforcement efforts to safeguard public health, safety,
and welfare.
On the other hand, the law ties its registration terminating
procedure to the same questionable terminology initially used to
classify offenders as "sexually violent predators."' The dispa-
rate conclusions likely to follow even expert application of the
terms "mental abnormality" and "personality disorder" render
the length of the registration duty imposed on these offenders
constitutionally invalid.' Again, public notification and inva-
sions of privacy would plague the offender without enhancing
public welfare.
A final difficulty that arises from the Federal Registration Act
lies in the absence of any procedure for purging law enforcement
records after the sex offender's duty to register has terminated.
For example, when the Supreme Court of California declared
certain applications of that state's registration statute unconsti-
tutional in In re Reed,' it specifically noted that the law did
not require officials to expunge collected private data following a
sex offender's release from the registration duty 9 Instead,
such information remained "permanently available." 9 Other
courts have failed to address any constitutional ramifications of
the perpetual retention of registration information.
Without a records-purging procedure, however, public disclo-
sure of private data obtained under the Federal Registration Act
would threaten the privacy rights of sex offenders throughout
their lives, probably well after the data had ceased to advance
the government's compelling interest in community safety Un-
der this analysis, the Federal Registration Act fails to meet the
narrow tailoring requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
225. See supra notes 175-96 and accompanying text.
226. Although proponents of the Federal Registration Act might again argue for
judicial deference to implied legislative definitions of these terms, the Federal Regis-
tration Act's reliance on expert evaluations indicates that Congress intended the use
of precise clinical diagnoses. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
227. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
228. Id. at 217; cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977) (noting that the New
York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required authorities to destroy regis-
tration materials after five years).
229. Reed, 663 P.2d at 219.
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CONCLUSION
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act addresses public concerns
about the health, safety, and welfare of communities in which
released sex offenders reside. It proposes to safeguard children
and other potential victims of violent sexual offenses from an
admittedly troubled segment of modern American society by al-
lowing law enforcement officials and members of the general
public to obtain personal data on convicted sex offenders. Such
alms provide a compelling interest in the operation of the statute.
For all of its lofty goals, however, the Registration Act still
must conform to the basic tenets of the Constitution and refrain
from any unnecessary encroachment on the right to privacy The
statute has a low threshold for triggering the public disclosure of
registry information. 30 It must therefore narrow the list of of-
fenders subject to privacy right infringements to the greatest
possible degree. The Act must also require these truly dangerous
individuals to register for only that period during which they
pose a real threat to community health, safety, and welfare.
The registration of sexually violent, but not mentally abnor-
mal, offenders should withstand constitutional scrutiny Al-
though research indicates that such individuals recidivate no
more often than other violent criminals, the likelihood of unre-
ported instances of repeat behavior justifies their registration
under the Act.
The Federal Registration Act's provisions for the registration
of "sexually violent predators" raise more serious constitutional
concerns. For these- portions of the Act to survive strict scrutiny
review, lawmakers must eliminate "mental abnormality" from
the Act's classification framework. This term carries no meaning
in the psychiatric community and can only lead to the unjusti-
fied inclusion of undeserving individuals in the category of "sex-
ually violent predators." As an alternative, legislators should
amend the law to cover individuals afflicted by relevant disor-
ders listed in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV In
230. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101(d), 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (allowing public disclosure necessary to
community protection).
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addition, the statutory scheme should contain specific cross-ref-
erences to that volume and its successors. A straightforward
provision, specifying that the definition of "personality disorder"
intended by the statute conforms to the DSM-IV's use of that
term, would bolster the Act's chances of surviving a right to
privacy challenge. Only in this manner can (1) experts evaluate
defendants with some degree of precision and (2) judges label
only truly dangerous individuals as "sexually violent predators"
and thus rightfully subject them to heightened address verifica-
tion procedures and potentially lifelong registration.
Further, the Federal Registration Act must allow all offenders,
regardless of their classification as "sexually violent offenders" or
"sexually violent predators," to petition for release from the duty
to register upon an adequate showing of rehabilitation. For sexu-
ally violent offenders, the Act should provide for this opportunity
at any point before the end of the current ten-year period. In any
case, the registration duty should automatically terminate at
that point. For sexually violent predators, this determination
must find its basis not in the vague language of "mental abnor-
mality" or "personality disorder" currently provided by the Act,
but in psychiatric terms precisely defined in and cross-referenced
to the DSM-IV In this manner, potential privacy right infringe-
ments will affect sex offenders only during the precise period
when they pose a true threat to community interests.
Finally, lawmakers must provide that when the sex offender
has made a showing of rehabilitation or when the statutorily
prescribed registration period has ended, state and federal law
enforcement authorities must purge their records of any refer-
ence to the offender's registration. Such a provision will elimi-
nate the potential for lifelong invasions of the offender's privacy
that do not further the government's ann of safeguarding public
health, safety, and welfare.
Each of these reforms requires precise drafting by federal
legislators and can only occur if lawmakers withstand the im-
pulse to answer impassioned public outcry with expansive and
ill-considered legislation. While politically popular in the short
term, such a response to the horrors of violent sexual offense
will in the long term only increase public cynicism and generate
widespread frustration with the political process. In time, the
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communal outrage now directed at convicted sex offenders could
easily shift its focus to legislators themselves, if the courts inval-
idate provisions of the Federal Registration Act for unconstitu-
tionally infringing the right to privacy
Catherine A. Trinkle
